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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Introduction 
In this appeal, Ms. Eastman is challenging a long-standing, unambiguous clause in her 
Farmers' underinsured motorist policy. This clause provides that if she is injured in a vehicle 
other than her insured vehicle that has underinsured motorist coverage, her injuries will be 
covered by that underinsured motorist policy rather than Farmers' policy. This "Other 
Insurance" clause has been part of Farmers' underinsured motorist policy language since at least 
1997. Insureds have previously unsuccessfully challenged this clause. In 2003, this Court held 
that the specific "Other Insurance" clause in this case was sound and unambiguous. Purdy v. 
Farmers Ins. Co., 138 Idaho 443, 446, 65 P.3d 184, 187 (2003). The Court also held in Purdy 
that the insured was not entitled to underinsured benefits from Farmers when in a vehicle other 
than his or her insured vehicle with underinsured motorist coverage. 
Despite the clear binding precedent of Purdy and the identical clause in her Farmers' 
policy, Ms. Eastman nevertheless filed a lawsuit and moved for summary judgment against 
Farmers. Not surprisingly, the District Court followed Purdy and denied Ms. Eastman's request 
for summary judgment. 
The District Court also rejected Ms. Eastman's flawed argument that a Disclosure 
Statement (a generic explanation of the types of underinsured motorist insurance available in 
Idaho based on the Idaho Department oflnsurance Bulletin) was part of her policy. Ms. Eastman 
advanced this "inclusion" argument, despite the fact that the plain language of the Disclosure 
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Statement provided m bold letters "[t]his general explanation is NOT an insurance 
agreement." 
Ms. Eastman also asserted a misguided argument that the subject policy language violates 
public policy. She contends she should be entitled to benefits under her UIM policy, despite the 
fact that she collected monies from both the tortfeasor and another non-Farmers underinsured 
motorist policy. As discussed herein, there are no public policy grounds under the facts and 
circumstances in this case that Purdy should be overruled and/or the language of Farmers' 
"Other Insurance" clause should be invalidated. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
Ms. Eastman filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment ruling as to her 
underinsured motorist coverage under her Farmers' policy of insurance. Both Ms. Eastman and 
Farmers filed Motions for Summary Judgment. The District Court granted Farmers' Motion for 
Summary Judgment and denied Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
C. Statement of Facts 
At all times relevant, Jennifer Eastman was the named insured on a policy issued by 
Farmers Insurance Company of Idaho, an E-Z Reader Car Policy - Idaho, 1st Edition for her 
2005 Toyota RAV 4. (R., 227) and (R., 12). Ms. Eastman had purchased underinsured motorist 
coverage for her insured vehicle. (R., 227) and (R., 12). On March 18, 2014, Ms. Eastman was 
a passenger in a 2009 Chevrolet Van, owned by Spokane Transit Authority, which was rear-
ended on Interstate 90. (R., 12). She was participating in an organized government ride share or 
ride pool program. The Van was insured with the Washington State Transit Insurance Van Pool. 
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Id. Ms. Eastman recovered her damages from the tortfeasor. Id. She received the limits of 
tortfeasor's liability policy. Id. Additionally, the Washington State Transit Insurance Van Pool 
maintained $60,000.00 in underinsured motorist coverage. Id. Due to multiple claimants, Ms. 
Eastman received approximately $47,000.00 in underinsured motorist benefits from the 
Washington State Transit Insurance Van Pool policy. Id. Thereafter, Ms. Eastman sought 
additional underinsured motorist benefits under her own policy with Farmers. Id 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A de novo review standard applies to an appeal arising from an order granting or denying 
summary judgment. Reynolds v. Trout Jones Gledhill Fuhrman, P.A., 293 P.3d 645, 650-651 
(2013). The standard of review on appeal from summary judgment is the same standard as that 
used by the district court in ruling on the motion for summary judgment. Taylor v. McNichols, 
149 Idaho 826, 832, 243 P.3d 642, 648 (2010). 
Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). "If there is no 
genuine issue of material fact, only a question of law remains, over which this Court exercises 
free review." Cristo Viene Pentecostal Church v. Paz, 144 Idaho 304, 307, 160 P.3d 743, 746 
(2007). 
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III. ARGUMENT 
A. Ms. Eastman's brief fails to identify the issues she is presenting on appeal 
and merely asks this Court to "second guess" the District Court, without referencing any 
legal errors of the District Court. 
Ms. Eastman's appellate brief fails to comply with the requirements of Idaho Appellate 
Rule 35. I.A.R. 35 expressly provides that the brief shall include "a list of the issues presented 
on appeal." I.A.R. 35(a)(4). Also, a general attack on the findings and conclusions of the district 
court, without specific reference to evidentiary or legal errors, is insufficient to preserve an issue. 
Michael v. Zehm, 74 Idaho 442, 445, 263 P.2d 990, 991 (1953) Under Idaho law, to the extent 
that an assignment of error is not argued and supported in compliance with the Idaho Appellate 
Rules, it is deemed to be waived. Suitts v. Nix, 141 Idaho 706, 708, 117 P.3d 120, 122 (2005). 
Here, Ms. Eastman's brief is missing a significant key component: identify the issue or 
issues she is presenting on appeal, as is required by I.A.R. 35(a)(4). Furthermore, she fails to 
specifically identify the alleged legal errors of the District Court. Rather, she generally argues 
that based on "public policy" she is entitled underinsured motorist coverage, contrary to the 
express language of the policy and contrary to the binding Idaho precedent. In light of these 
significant omissions, under Idaho law, Ms. Eastman may have failed to preserve these issues for 
appeal and/or any argument as to assignment of error is deemed waived. See Suitts, 141 Idaho at 
708, 117 P.3d at 122. 
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B. Applicable Policy Provisions 
The appellate issues pending before the Court involve Ms. Eastman's Farmers' 
underinsured motorist policy, Endorsement ID 021A, which provides, in relevant part, as 
follows: 
Coverage C-1 UNDERinsured Motorist Coverage 
We will pay all sums which an insured person is legally entitled to recover as 
damages from the owner or operator of an UNDERinsured motor vehicle 
because of bodily injury sustained by the insured person. 
Limits of Liability 
a. Our liability under the UNDERinsured Motorist Coverage cannot exceed 
the limits of the UNDERinsured Motorist Coverage stated in this policy, 
and our maximum liability under the UNDERinsured Motorist Coverage 
is the lesser of: 
1. The difference between the amount paid in damages to the 
insured person by and for any person or organization who may be 
legally liable for the bodily injury, and the limit of 
UNDERinsured Motorist Coverage; or 
2. The amount of damages established but not recovered by any 
agreement, settlement, or judgment with or for the person or 
organization legally liable for the bodily injury. 
Other Insurance 
3. We will not provide insurance for a vehicle other than your insured car 
or your insured motorcycle, unless the owner of that vehicle has no other 
insurance applicable to this part. 
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(R., 277-278) 
Under Idaho law, a policy provision is only ambiguous if it is reasonably subject to 
differing interpretations. Moss v. Mid-Am. Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 103 Idaho 298, 647 P.2d 
754 (1982). Additionally, when deciding whether or not a particular provision is ambiguous, the 
court must consider the provision within the context in which it occurs in the policy. North Pac. 
Ins. Co. v. Mai, 130 Idaho 251, 939 P.2d 570 (1997). As discussed below, the subject policy is 
not ambiguous. 
C. The District Court in this case correctly applied the doctrine of Stare Decisis, 
relying on Purdy v. Farmers Ins. Co., which remains sound law, to apply the "Other 
Insurance" clause in the policy limiting Ms. Eastman's UIM coverage. 
The specific language of Ms. Eastman's underinsured motorist policy has already been 
evaluated by the Court. In 2003, the Idaho Supreme Court addressed the "Other Insurance" 
clause in the Farmers' underinsured motorist policy. Purdy v. Farmers Ins. Co., 138 Idaho 443, 
446, 65 P .3d 184, 187 (2003). 1 Ms. Eastman, through her counsel, has admitted that the "Other 
Insurance" provision in this case is identical to the clause in Purdy. (R., 327). Accordingly, the 
District Court correctly held that it was bound by stare decisis and appropriately relied upon 
Purdy in denying Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. (R., 333). As the District Court 
aptly held, "Purdy remains good law." Id. Accordingly, Ms. Eastman's appeal lacks merit. 
In Purdy, the Purdys' challenged the non-owned, but insured UIM clause in a Farmers' 
policy. Purdy, 138 Idaho at 446, 65 P.3d at 187. As background, prior to the 1997 accident in 
Purdy, the Purdys had purchased an underinsured motorist policy from Farmers Insurance with 
1 Of note, in the Purdys' Farmers policy, this clause was found in paragraph 4, as opposed to paragraph 3 in the 
subject policy, but otherwise was identically worded to the subject policy. 
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underinsured limits of $100,000.00. Id. at 445. Beth Purdy was severely injured while riding as 
a passenger in a car owned and operated by her mother. Id. Her mother's car was rear-ended by 
a truck. Id. The truck driver's liability policy settled with the Purdys for $17,500.00. Id. Her 
mother maintained an underinsured motorist policy with Farmers Alliance and had underinsured 
motorist limits of $25,000.00. Id. Farmers Alliance paid the Purdys underinsured motorist 
benefits of $25,000.00 under her mother's policy. Id. 
The Purdys then submitted a proof of loss to Farmers Insurance in an attempt to obtain 
additional underinsured motorist benefits under their own policy. Id. In Purdy, Farmers denied 
the Purdys' claim for underinsured motorist benefits based on the above-referenced "Other 
Insurance" clause because Ms. Purdy was injured in a vehicle which was not her "insured car" 
and the owner of the car (her mother) had an underinsured motorist policy. Id. 
Thereafter, the Purdys filed a lawsuit against Farmers alleging breach of contract and bad 
faith. Id. In the subsequent litigation, Farmers filed a motion for summary judgment on the 
Purdys' claim for bad faith. Id. On summary judgment, Farmers argued there was no bad faith 
cause of action because there was no coverage under the policy. Id. In opposing Farmers' 
summary judgment, the Purdys argued that the policy contained several ambiguities. In that 
case, the Purdys argued that the phrase, "We will not provide insurance for a vehicle other than 
your insured car" was redundant when read with conjunction with the similarly worded 
underinsured motorist exclusion which provided "this coverage does not apply to bodily injury 
sustained by a person if the person was occupying a vehicle you do not own which is insured for 
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this coverage under another policy." Purdy, 138 Idaho at 447, 65 P.3d at 188. The Purdys 
argued that this redundancy made the policy ambiguous. Id. 
On appeal, the Court noted that while redundancy may be considered when interpreting 
an ambiguous provision in an insurance policy, redundancy does not by itself make policy 
provisions ambiguous. Id. 
Ultimately, in Purdy, the Idaho Supreme Court concluded that the language in the 
Farmers' policy was unambiguous. Id at 448. The Court also affirmed the District Court's 
holding that there was no coverage under the Purdys' Farmers policy for Ms. Purdy's injuries 
because she was injured in a vehicle that was not her insured vehicle and the owner had an 
underinsured motorist policy. Id 
In this case, based on Purdy, the Court should affirm the District Court's ruling and 
conclude that the "Other Insurance" clause in Farmers' policy is unambiguous and enforceable. 
(R., 333). As is undisputed in this case, Ms. Eastman was injured in a vehicle other than her 
"insured car," the Toyota Rav 4. Additionally, the owner of the Van had underinsured motorist 
coverage which has paid Ms. Eastman for her injuries. 
Accordingly, the District Court correctly determined, under the sound law set forth in 
Purdy, that there is no underinsured motorist coverage under Farmers' policy for Ms. Eastman 
for this accident. 
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D. The District Court correctly dismissed Ms. Eastman's suggestion that the 
"Disclosure Statement" is part of the UIM insurance agreement and as such would 
distinguish this case from Purdy. 
In its Memorandum Decision and Order, the District Court correctly noted "[a] court 
reviewing a claim based on the contract begins with the language of the contract itself." (R., 
323). Cristo Viene Pentecostal Church, 144 Idaho at 307, 160 P.3d at 746. In this case, the 
Disclosure Statement which forms the basis of Ms. Eastman's argument, in pertinent part, 
provides as follows: 
Idaho law requires that every auto liability insurance policy include 
Uninsured Motorist (UM) coverage and Underinsured Motorist (UIM) bodily 
injury coverage, unless a named insured has rejected these coverages in writing. If 
the insured is not provided a copy of the written rejection at the time it is made, 
the insured may receive a copy from the insurer upon request. 
UM coverage may pay damages for bodily injury to an insured person 
who is legally entitled to collect damages from the owner or operator of a vehicle 
that has no insurance, or from a hit-and-run vehicle where the owner or operator 
is unknown. 
UIM coverage may pay damages for bodily injury to an insured person 
who is legally entitled to collect damages from the owner or operator of a vehicle 
with inadequate limits of liability insurance coverage. 
UIM coverage is offered in different forms by different insurers, and 
insurers are not required to offer more than one type of UIM coverage. There are 
two commonly available forms of UIM coverage - "Difference in Limits" ( or 
"Offset") Coverage and "Excess" Coverage. Your policy offers "Difference in 
Limits" which is briefly explained below: 
"'Difference in Limits"' (or "'Offset"') Coverage- The policy's UIM 
coverage limits are reduced or eliminated by the amount of any damages 
recovered by an insured, from or on behalf of any underinsured owner(s) or 
operators( s). 
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This general explanation is NOT an insurance agreement. All auto 
liability insurance policies that include UM and/or UIM coverage have other 
terms and conditions that may affect or limit the availability of either 
coverage .... 
(R., 275) 
Before the District Court, Ms. Eastman argued that the above-referenced "Disclosure 
Statement" was included in the parties' contractual agreement. She argued the Disclosure 
Statement means that whenever the insured recovers an amount, Defendant's liability is reduced 
or off-set by that recovery. 2 (R., 327). 
In addition to erroneously arguing that the Disclosure Statement is part of the policy, Ms. 
Eastman's reading of the Disclosure Statement is also misguided because she fails to appreciate 
the difference between liability insurance and underinsured motorist insurance. Here, the 
Disclosure Statement states "UIM coverage may pay for bodily injury to an insured person who 
is legally entitled to collect damages from the owner or operator of a vehicle with inadequate 
limits of liability insurance coverage." (Emphasis added.) The italicized words above are of high 
importance. UIM coverage is limited to circumstances where the owner or operator of a vehicle 
has inadequate limits of liability insurance coverage. This is fundamental to the purpose of 
2 Ms. Eastman argues for the following reading of the policy: 
We will pay all sums which an insured person is legally entitled to recover as damages from the 
owner or operator of an underinsured motor vehicle because of bodily injury sustained by the 
insured person [but] the policy's UIM coverage limits are reduced or eliminated by the amount of 
any damages recovered by any insured, from or on behalf of any underinsured(s) owner or 
operator(s). 
Mot. Hr'g Nov. I, 2016 at 3:23 p.m., See (R., 327). 
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underinsured motorist coverage. Here, Ms. Eastman suggests that if a vehicle owner is 
"underinsured," then Ms. Eastman's own policy of insurance should apply to provide 
underinsured insured motorist benefits to her in this case. 
However, the critical flaw in Ms. Eastman's argument is that both the Disclosure 
Statement and the actual UIM language of her insurance policy provide that UIM payments are 
for bodily injury to an insured person who is legally entitled to collect damages from the owner 
or operator of a vehicle with inadequate limits of liability insurance coverage. Hence, while Ms. 
Eastman is correct that it does not matter if the individual who is underinsured is the operator or 
the owner, the type of insurance that is insufficient does matter. 
Of significance, here, Ms. Eastman is not arguing that the owner of the van she was 
riding in had any liability for proximately causing the subject. Nor has there has been any 
suggestion that the van's liability policy was inadequate. Rather, Ms. Eastman's argument is that 
the van's underinsured motorist coverage for Ms. Eastman was inadequate. Liability insurance 
and underinsured motorist insurance are different, apply in different circumstances and cannot be 
intermixed as Ms. Eastman suggests. 
While noting Ms. Eastman's suggested interpretation, in its Memorandum Decision and 
Order, the District Court expressly and succinctly stated, "the dispositive issue with this 
argument is that the disclosure is not part of the insurance contract." (R., 327). As reviewed by 
the District Court, the Disclosure Statement explains what the law requires, explains what may 
be provided to the insured, briefly explains how it may be provided, and then unambiguously 
provides in bold: "This general explanation is NOT an insurance agreement. All auto liability 
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insurance policies that include ... UIM coverage have other terms and conditions that may 
affect or limit the availability of either coverage." (R., 328 and 275). 
In rejecting Ms. Eastman's inclusion argument, the District Court stated "to find that 
this disclosure statement was part of the contract would defy the plain language of the 
document." (R., 328). "A document that sets forth in no uncertain terms it is not part of the 
agreement cannot, by its very own language, establish terms to a contract it is not a part of." (R., 
329). Accordingly, the District Court held the disclosure statement was separate from the 
insurance contract and therefore it cannot be used to interpret the insurance contract. Id. 
However, of significance, the District Court went one step further and, for the sake of 
argument, addressed coverage and the language of the contract as if the Disclosure Statement 
was part of the policy of insurance. Not surprisingly, the end result remained the same. The 
Disclosure Statement, by its plain terms provides that "other terms and conditions may affect or 
limit availability of coverage." 
Hence, even for sake of argument, if Ms. Eastman's misguided inclusion argument of the 
Disclosure Statement is accepted and it is considered part of the policy, the "terms and 
conditions" as set forth in the "Other Insurance" clause further limiting underinsured motorist 
coverage still remain part of the underinsured motorist policy. (R., 329). Accordingly, based on 
the controlling precedent of Purdy, Ms. Eastman still has no coverage under the policy for this 
accident. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 12 
The bottom line remains, as the District Court aptly explained, Ms. Eastman "has failed 
to distinguish the policy language and facts from Purdy and, consequently, this Court is bound to 
interpret the same provision in the same fashion." (R., 329). 
Similarly, on appeal, Ms. Eastman wholly fails to address the Court's clear contractual 
holding based on plain language of the document. Ms. Eastman also fails to provide any legal 
authority to suggest such a ruling was legally erroneous. Rather, on appeal, Ms. Eastman skirts 
around the straight-forward issue of the plain and unambiguous language of the contract and 
argues that based on "public policy" the contractual language should be read differently than it is 
actually written. 
Also, on appeal Ms. Eastman improperly, for the first time, raises two new arguments: 
her argument that the Disclosure Statement is incorporated by reference and her argument that 
the Disclosure Statement combined with the Policy provides illusory coverage. Here, Ms. 
Eastman did not raise these arguments in the District Court. (R., 329, fn. 5). 
Because these issues were not raised before the District Court, this Court should not 
consider them on appeal. Mc Kinney v. State, 133 Idaho 695, 708, 992 P.2d 144, 157 (1999) 
citing McCoy v. State, 129 Idaho 70, 75, 921 P.2d 1194, 1199 (1996). Furthermore, neither of 
these arguments are meritorious nor do such arguments provide grounds to overrule Purdy. 
E. Farmers' policy and the "Other Insurance" clause do not violate any 
established public policy in Idaho. 
At both the District Court and on appeal, Ms. Eastman makes a general and non-specific 
argument that the "Other Insurance" underinsured motorist policy language at issue violates 
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public policy and she seeks a judicial ruling that she should be entitled to coverage under 
Farmers' UIM policy. Whether an insurance contract is against public policy "is to be 
determined from all the facts and circumstances of each case." Hill v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 
150 Idaho 619, 623, 249 P.3d 812, 816 (2011) citing Foremost Ins. Co. v. Putzier, 100 Idaho 
883,887,606 P.2d 987, 991 (1980). 
Here, as discussed below, the facts and the circumstances of this case strongly weigh 
against a finding that the subject Farmers policy language violates public policy. The policy 
language at issue is an unambiguous clause merely designating which underinsured motorist 
coverage applies, if the insured is not in the designed insured vehicle at the time of the accident. 
Farmers' policy limitation does not wholly preclude an insured's collection of underinsured 
motorist benefits. Additionally, Farmers policy limitation does not leave an insured with no 
redress for his or her injuries, it simply limits the applicable of Farmers' underinsured motorist 
coverage when another underinsured motorist policy applies. Furthermore, the clause at issue 
does not provide a "condition precedent" to obtaining underinsured motorist coverage (i.e., like 
an exhaustion clause). The "Other Insurance" clause does not violate public policy. 
As the Court is aware, in the Idaho legislature's 2008 amendment to Idaho Code § 41-
2502, the legislature only required that insurance companies offer underinsured motorist 
coverage and expressly provided that insureds can reject it. Several other states, such as 
Nebraska and Illinois, have clear legislation mandating the inclusion of underinsured motorist 
coverage with every liability policy underwritten. Yet, Idaho, unlike other states, has not taken 
the step to make the underinsured motorist coverage "mandatory" or applicable in all policies of 
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insurance. While a mandatory statutory scheme of underinsured motorist coverage may be better 
suited to serving the goal of protecting Idaho drivers from uncompensated harm caused by 
underinsured motorist; nevertheless, at this time, Idaho's underinsured motorist coverage 
remains wholly "optional." 
Additionally, Idaho public policy underlying underinsured motorist coverage remains 
largely undefined, likely due to the optional nature of Idaho's underinsured motorist legislation. 
Public policy case law discussions relating to underinsured motorist insurance are unclear, 
convoluted and appear divided, especially when considered in relationship to the actual scope of 
Idaho's statute (i.e., requiring insurance companies to "offer" underinsured motorist benefits to 
an insured and obtain a written waiver if the benefits are not purchased). Moreover, in Idaho, the 
scope and the breadth of any public policy as it pertains to underinsured motorist coverage 
remains uncertain. (R., 332). 
Specifically, none of this Court's decisions addressing UIM following the 2008 
legislative amendment, including Hill and Gearhart, are clearly binding precedent applicable to 
the facts and circumstances in this case. None of these cases reference Purdy or discuss how 
public policy applies, generally, to contracts of insurance which have underinsured motorist 
coverage limitations set forth in the policy like the "Other Insurance" clause. Additionally, as 
discussed below, the holdings of Hill and Gearhart should be limited to the facts and contract 
provisions addressed in those decisions. 
Hill is distinguishable from the subject case. Hill, 150 Idaho at 619, 249 P.3d at 812. In 
Hill, the Court stated it must evaluate whether requiring insureds to comply with UIM 
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exhaustion clauses would thwart the Legislature's goal of protecting motorists from underinsured 
drivers. Id. First, in this case, the language at issue does not involve an exhaustion clause. 
Another distinguishing factor is that the exhaustion clause in Hill acted as a complete bar to 
obtaining UIM coverage, whereas the policy provision in this case merely provides for an 
election of UIM policies or a limitation on Farmers' UIM coverage. 
Second, the "public policy" used by the majority in the Hill decision is muddled, unclear 
and provides no general guidance to the application of public policy in underinsured motorist 
contracts. Id. at 632 .. The majority in Hill held that the exhaustion clause in the American Family 
policy was void based on Idaho's "public policy aimed at protecting its citizens from 
underinsured drivers" and "based on the doctrine of judicial economy, which includes shielding 
parties from excessive litigation and preventing unnecessary demands on the judicial system." 
Id. However, the majority in Hill appears to suggest that UIM coverage is mandatory for all 
individuals, contrary to the express directive of the Idaho legislature which only requires that 
insurance companies offer such coverage and allows insureds to reject it. Id. As the dissent in 
Hill notes, the "majority's hyperbole indicates it believes that a statute simply requiring insurance 
companies to offer UIM coverage will somehow magically reduce accidents caused by 
underinsured motorists." Id. Accordingly, there is no clear public policy take away from Hill 
applicable to the subject case. 
In Gearhart, another divided Court invalidated an anti-stacking provision in a Mutual of 
Enumclaw UIM policy. Gearhart v. Mut. of Enumclaw Ins. Co., 378 P.3d 454 (2016). In 
Gearhart, a minor's parents had each purchased identical polices containing underinsured 
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motorist coverage from Mutual of Enumclaw. Gearhart, 378 P.3d at 455. After the minor was 
seriously injured, each parent sought coverage under his or her respective underinsured motorist 
coverage with Mutual of Enumclaw for their child, hoping to obtain the joint $600,000 worth of 
UIM coverage the parents had together. Id. The at-issue insurance clause in Gearhart read: 
If this policy and any other policy providing similar insurance apply to the 
accident, the maximum limit of liability under all the policies shall be the highest 
applicable limit of liability under any one policy. However, insurance we provide 
with respect to a vehicle you do not own shall be excess over any other collectible 
insurance. 
Id. As explained m Gearhart, anti-stacking provisions are designed to keep insureds with 
multiple policies from the same company from being overcompensated for their injuries and in 
the Gearhart policy provided the insured with the highest applicable limit under any one policy. 
Id. at 457. In Gearhart, the majority held that the "actual language employed in the Enumclaw 
policies was confusing to the extent that it is ineffective to establish a barrier to recovery of 
Trent's (the insured's) actual damages in the full amount of the limit provided in each of the two 
Enumclaw policies." Id. at 456. 
Unlike Gearhart, this case does not involve interpretation of anti-stacking language 
similar to the language referenced above. Additionally, this case does not involve the 
interpretation of two Farmers' UIM policies purchased by Ms. Eastman, like in Gearhart. 
Rather, this case involves language of one policy designating which underinsured motorist 
coverage applies if Ms. Eastman was injured while not in her insured vehicle. Additionally, 
Gearhart is distinguishable because the subject policy language at issue in this case is not 
"confusing" like the Mutual of Enumclaw policy was, according to the Gearhart court. In fact, 
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the Idaho Supreme Court has already expressly concluded that the subject "Other Insurance" 
clause in this case is unambiguous and clear. 
In Gearhart, the majority generically held that the barrier imposed by the anti-stacking 
provision "caused the insured to be undercompensated" and did not advance the public policy 
enunciated in Hill, a case involving a bar to UIM coverage and exhaustion clauses. 
Unfortunately, Gearhart does not provide any significant guidance as to the application of the 
public policy underlying underinsured motorist insurance and more specifically, application of 
public policy to Farmers' "Other Insurance" clause. Thus, the Court's ruling in Gearhart does 
not support Ms. Eastman's public policy argument in this case. 
Here, the District Court correctly stated in rejecting Ms. Eastman's urgings to invalidate 
Farmers' policy on public policy grounds: 
As between controlling and undoubtedly applicable precedent in Purdy and two 
uncertain and divided holdings in Hill and Gearhart, this Court resorts to stare 
decisis and relies on Purdy. The Court is not convinced that Purdy is manifestly 
wrong or has been proven over time to be unjust or unwise. Neither is the Court 
convinced that the application of Purdy here is a plain, obvious and continued 
injustice to principles of law and remedy. 
(R., 333). 
Hence, this Court should similarly be guided by its clear opinion previously issued in 
Purdy, and reject Ms. Eastman's suggestion that the previously reviewed "Other Insurance" 
provision should now be invalidated as against public policy. Furthermore, Hill and Gearhart, 
the two UIM cases decided after 2008 are distinguishable from the present case. In sum, Purdy 
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remains sound law and there is no public policy consideration weighing in favor of invalidating 
Farmers' "Other Insurance" clause limiting the insured's underinsured motorist coverage. 
IV. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
Farmers requests an award of costs and fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rules 
40and 41, and Idaho Code § 12-121. An award of attorney fees is appropriate if this Court finds 
that the appeal was pursued frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation. Kirkman v. Stoker, 
134 Idaho 541,546, 6 P.3d 397,402 (2000). Such an award is proper where the appellant argued 
issues that were not preserved for appeal, the appellant invited this Court to substitute its own 
judgment for that of the District Court and the appellant asks this Court to ignore firmly-
established law. Id. at 546. Where an appellant's argument hinges on a question of law, attorney 
fees will be awarded under LC.§ 12-121 if the question of law is clearly settled and the appellant 
makes no substantial showing that the district court misapplied the law. Hutchinson v. State, 134 
Idaho 18, 23, 995 P .2d 363, 368 (Ct. App. 1999). It is also proper when the appellant does 
nothing more than simply invite this Court to second-guess a District Court. Pass v. Kenny, 118 
Idaho 445,450, 797 P.2d 153, 157 (Ct. App. 1990). 
Here, in the face of the long-standing binding precedent and evaluation of the identical 
Farmers' clause in Purdy, Ms. Eastman asks this Court to overrule that well-reasoned 
decision. In pursuit of the appeal, Ms. Eastman failed to identify her issues on appeal and only 
vaguely referenced the District Court's ruling in this case. Under Idaho law, fees are appropriate 
when the appellant does nothing more than simply invite this Court to second-guess a District 
Court, as Ms. Eastman did on this appeal. 
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Here, the District Court expressly held that Ms. Eastman failed to distinguish the policy 
language and facts from Purdy and, consequently, the District Court was bound to interpret the 
same provision in the same fashion. On appeal, Ms. Eastman made no substantial showing that 
the District Court misapplied well-settled law. 
V. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Farmers respectfully requests this Court affirm the 
decisions of the District Court in all respects and award costs and fees. 
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